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Abstract
Wide differences between effective or realised average tax rates and tax yields that would result if
statutory tax rates were strictly applied indicate tax compliance and collection problems.  Due to
the greater politicisation of tax systems in transition economies (TEs), we would expect the
shortfalls in effective tax yields for TEs to be larger than a benchmark for the mature market
economies where tax systems are well established, the administrative capacity is stronger and tax
arrears are tolerated less frequently.  The methodology involves calculating an effective/statutory
(E/S) tax ratio.  Initial results indicate that the leading TEs have E/S ratios similar to the EU
average.  We find a positive correlation between progress in transition and effective tax
administration, as measured by our E/S ratio.  For slow reformers, the effectiveness of tax
collection appears to vary with the extent of state control.  Those TEs that have maintained the
apparatus of the state have done well in tax collection compared to those countries where there is
evidence of state decay.  This raises a number of broad policy issues relating to the speed of
transition, the interaction of politics and economic reforms, the capacity of the state to govern and
the need for market institutions to develop.
Key words: statutory taxation, average tax rate, tax collection, effective administration, transition
economies
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* The analysis in this paper builds on work conducted for the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, to whom we are grateful for financial support.  We are grateful also to Michael Alexeev,
Alan Bevan, and the participants at the July 2000 Galway workshop on “Institutions in Transition
Economies” for helpful comments earlier versions of this paper.  All views expressed in this paper are,
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1.  Introduction
This paper attempts to measure the effectiveness of tax administration in transition economies
(TEs) and how it compares to a benchmark for the mature market economies.  We measure the
effectiveness of tax administration by comparing statutory tax rates with effective tax yields.
This method of measuring the administrative capacity of tax systems has been alluded to in the
taxation literature but not systematically pursued in cross-country comparisons.  Alex Radian, in
his inquiry into tax administration in poor countries, noted that effective tax rates are lower than
legal tax rates (Radian, 1980).  David Newbery raised the issue of differences between statutory
and effective tax rates, again in the context of developing countries, when he stressed the
importance of examining the effective tax system rather than the legally defined tax system
(Newbery and Stern, 1987).  In the same World Bank publication, Vito Tanzi suggested that the
gap between the statutory tax system and the effective tax system might be large in developing
countries (Newbery and Stern, 1987).  Elsewhere, Burgess and Stern (1993) argued that the
wedge between the statutory and effective tax systems can be reduced by improvements in
administrative capabilities.  In this paper, we take a methodology previously used for measuring
fiscal or revenue capacity in federal states (ACIR 1962) and adapt it to enable inter-country
comparisons of effective vs. statutory taxation.  We then use actual fiscal and national accounts
data from 25 TEs and, as a benchmark, the average for the 15 member countries of the European
Union, to measure the effectiveness of tax administration.
Tax exemptions, deferrals, write-offs and arrears that firms receive or extract from the state are
widespread, not only in transition economies but in market economies as well.  In a broader
sense, these tax concessions are often manifestations of a tax system that is politicised.  One
possible result of this bargaining and general politicisation of the tax system is a low level of tax
compliance combined with a high incidence of tax avoidance.
1 Measuring the extent of this
financial aid using firm-level information is difficult and faces obvious data difficulties, e.g.,
these concessions may not be widely known or may not show up in the government’s budget.  By
measuring the difference between effective and statutory taxation at the aggregate level, our
                                                          
1 This paper deals with tax avoidance as distinct from tax evasion.  Tax avoidance is defined as the use of
the tax system to minimise tax liabilities or obligations.  It is a legal activity as distinct from the illegal (and
acutely difficult to measure) activity of tax evasion.  One way that enterprises can reduce their tax burden is
by transferring their tax liabilities abroad.  Transfer pricing is common in market economies where
multinational corporations use their foreign subsidiaries that operate in low tax jurisdictions to reduce their
overall tax burden.  A well-known case is that of Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation, a company that2
methodology enables us to obtain aggregate measures of the degree of effectiveness of tax
collection that can be compared across countries, for different taxes, and over time.  In this paper
we develop indicators that allow us to measure how broadly and strictly valued added tax, payroll
tax and corporate income tax are implemented and complied with in TEs.  We use the average of
the EU-15 countries as an appropriate benchmark for comparison. Our focus is on comparisons
for the most recent year available; comparisons over time will be pursued in future work.
2.  The Tax System in TEs
The tax system that existed under the socialist command economy was different from a Western-
style tax system.  There was no corporate income tax system, in the usual sense of the term.  State
enterprises were subservient to the various ministries and any ‘profits’ made were expropriated
by the state.  Likewise, losses were made good by arbitrary pricing and subsidies.  Often, tax rates
were numerous and non-parametric, tax structures were complex and differentiated, and tax
liabilities were discretionary and negotiable.  The main sources of tax revenue were typically
enterprise profit tax, turnover tax (with highly differentiated, product-specific rates) and payroll
taxes; direct taxes on individuals were unimportant.  Although taxation as a percentage of GDP
was high in socialist countries, administrative costs were low and tax collection was
straightforward as firms tended to be large and closely monitored.  In the Soviet system, ‘taxes’
were collected from the enterprise, with the State Bank acting as the fiscal agent of the state.
Once the socialist system collapsed, TEs, some lacking an explicit tax system (or culture), had to
build a market-oriented, rule-based tax system (including a market-type tax administration) from
scratch.  The creation of a new tax system involved the introduction of a corporate income tax
system.  Not only did this involve changes in how enterprises were treated by the state in terms of
taxation, but it was also introduced in conjunction with other policies, such as price liberalisation,
demonopolisation and privatisation.  A VAT system to replace the turnover tax was introduced in
the early years of transition and was in place in most TEs by 1994.  Tax on individuals accounted
for a small proportion of the total tax take in socialist countries: the transition to a market
economy meant that a personal income tax system as operates in market economies was also to be
introduced.
                                                                                                                                                                            
made  ₤1.4 billion in profits in Britain but reportedly paid no corporation tax there (The Economist,
29/1/00).3
In the context of TEs and taxation, we are interested in the hardening of budget constraints of
firms.  Hence, the firm is the unit of analysis in this paper.  As for the different taxes paid by the
firm, corporate income or profit tax, value-added tax and social security taxes are mostly linear,
flat rate taxes.
2  Neither sales taxes (because they are levied at one stage only) nor excise taxes
(because they are product-specific) are considered in our study.  We do, however, treat social
security contributions as a payroll tax.
As mentioned above, we will concentrate on three taxes paid by the firm: corporate income tax
(CIT), value-added tax (VAT) and social security tax (SST).  Although VAT is essentially a tax
charged on final purchasers, it is imposed at different stages of production at the firm level. For
these three taxes, we estimate the difference between effective average tax rates and tax yields
that would result if statutory tax rates were strictly applied.  The methodology is explained below.
3.  Methodology
Our methodology is based on one commonly used in measuring tax or fiscal capacity in federal
states.  The ACIR Representative Tax System (RTS) method was initially proposed in the early
1960s and has been modified on several occasions since then (see ACIR 1962; 1971; 1982).
Essentially, by applying national average or representative tax rates to member-state tax bases,
the RTS method shows the amount of revenue that could be collected by the individual member
states of a federal country, i.e., their fiscal capacity.  With some modifications, we apply this
methodology to sovereign states (and transition countries, in particular) rather than to states
within a federal system.
We begin with some definitions.  Statutory tax rates are the rates that taxpayers are required to
pay by law.  Effective tax rates are the realised average tax rates.  These are the same average tax
rates as employed by Whalley (1975), Lucas (1990) and Mendoza et al. (1994).
3
                                                          
2 A linear tax is a tax whose marginal rate is constant.
3 These are aggregate average tax rates as distinct from the effective marginal tax rates that are commonly
used in studies of household income, income distribution and taxation.  Aggregate tax rates are normally
used in macroeconomic modeling and in the taxation, economic growth and supply-side economics debate.
For the problems associated with measuring effective tax rates, see Fullerton (1984).4
Let Y be the gross tax base and T be actual tax payments; hence income net of tax is Y-T.  We
denote by t the statutory tax rate applied to gross income.  The effective tax rate e, also defined
on a gross basis, is calculated by dividing actual tax payments T by the appropriate gross tax
base, or
Y
T
e ≡ (1)
Using the statutory and effective tax rates thus defined, we calculate two indicators that measure
the effectiveness of tax administration.  The first indicator is the ratio of effective tax to statutory
tax.  The effective/statutory (E/S) ratio is defined as follows:
tY
T
t
e
ratio statutory Effective ≡ ≡ / (2)
This indicator measures the extent of the wedge between the statutory tax rate and the realised
average tax rate.  A ratio close to 1 indicates that the effective tax rate is close to the statutory tax
rate.  A ratio below 1 indicates that the effective tax yield is falling short of what application of
the statutory tax rate would yield.  Differences across countries in the extent of this shortfall in
revenue may be accounted for by tax breaks, tax arrears and tax avoidance measures.
4
As approximations of the gross tax base Y, we use national accounts measures of income: for
VAT, total national income (GDP); for SST, income from labour; and for CIT, income from
capital.  These are, of course, only rough approximations of the actual statutory tax bases.  For
example: even in market economies, large portions of the economy are exempt from VAT (e.g.,
public administration and education); corporate income tax applies only to corporations and the
usual tax base is net of depreciation and interest; for all three taxes, entities must usually be over
a certain size threshold before becoming liable for taxation.  Furthermore, the national accounts
statistics of transition countries are generally regarded as less reliable than those of developed
market economies, including their statistics on the division of GDP into labour and capital
income. National accounts measures of income do, however, have the important advantages of
being both readily available and, in principle, readily comparable across countries.  Moreover,5
our focus is not on levels of effective taxation in countries but on comparisons of levels across
countries, and as noted the reasons for these deviations between income measures and statutory
tax bases are found in all countries.
Our second indicator entirely avoids these possible problems with national accounts measures of
income by simply not attempting to match tax payments to the appropriate tax base. The
normalised tax yield (NTY) instead relates tax payments adjusted for cross-country differences in
statutory rates to GDP, and is defined as follows:
t
b
GDP
T
yield tax Normalised ≡ (3)
where t is the statutory tax rate and b is a benchmark rate.  Put simply, the normalised tax yield
tells us what the tax yield (for a particular tax) would be for a specific country if the statutory tax
rate were the same for all countries.
In the definitions above, we have used the convention of a tax base that is gross of tax.  In
practice, statutory tax rates are sometimes defined relative to a tax base that is inclusive of tax and
tax liabilities are paid out of gross income; and sometimes statutory rates are defined relative to a
tax base that is net of tax.  Corporate income tax (like personal income tax) is an example of the
former; tax liability is calculated by applying the corporate tax rate to gross profit.  VAT and SST
are examples of the latter. Firms calculate their gross VAT liability by “adding on” VAT as a
percentage of the pre-tax price, and SST is typically calculated as a percentage of wages and
salaries paid.  We use the former convention – the tax base is gross of tax – for our calculations
for all three taxes considered.  This requires adjustments to the statutory tax rate for both VAT
and SST.
5
                                                                                                                                                                            
4 Accounting for tax evasion will depend on whether the national accounts adjust for the hidden economy.
If there is an evasion adjustment in the calculation of GDP, tax evasion is captured by our measure; how
fully will depend on the accuracy of the adjustment.
5 We are therefore using gross income only and adjusting statutory rates as necessary.  The alternative
approach would be to use statutory rates in conjunction with gross or net income, as appropriate.  This
approach, however, encounters data availability problems with net income.  As noted above, we use
national accounts measures of gross income that are only approximations of the actual tax base.
Calculating net income from these approximations and the actual tax yield introduces further measurement
error into the tax base approximations.  By contrast, our tax rate adjustment in equation (5) is an identity
and introduces no such measurement error.6
Denote by t
N the tax rate applied to net income Y(1-t) that would yield the identical tax revenue
as the tax rate t applied to gross income Y. We then have, by definition,
[] ) 1 ( t Y t tY
N − ≡ (4)
Rearranging equation (4) yields
N
N
t
t
t
+
≡
1
(5)
Equation (5) is used to convert a tax rate defined by statute as applying to net income into the
equivalent tax rate on gross income.
We illustrate this adjustment by reporting the benchmark rates used to calculate our normalised
tax yield indicator. We denote by b
N the benchmark net of tax rate equivalent to the gross rate b.
We take as our benchmark rates the approximate (rounded to the nearest five or ten per cent)
average statutory tax rates in use in the 15 member states of the European Union: b
N=20% for
VAT, b
N=40% for SST, and b=35% for CIT.  The following table reports the equivalent gross
and net rates for these benchmarks; the figures in bold are the statutory rates as legally defined by
statute.
Table 1: Benchmark Tax Rates, Gross and Net Equivalents
Rates defined by statute in bold
bb
N
VAT 16.7% 20%
SST 28.6% 40%
CIT 35% 53.8%
4.  Data Coverage and Sources
Our primary interest is in examining the administrative capacity of tax systems in TEs and how it
compares to levels in well-established market economies.  We use the mean of the EU-15
countries as a benchmark, taking 1996 as the benchmark year.7
There are 25 ex-socialist countries in our study; the TEs that are not included are those where tax
data are difficult to obtain (Mongolia, Vietnam), where the tax system is highly complicated
(China) or where war has occurred (Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina).  Ten of our 25
countries are CEE countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, FYR Macedonia,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia) for which we use data primarily for
the period 1991 – 1997.  The remaining 15 are all FSU countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan) for which the relevant period is 1992 – 1997.
6  All these
countries have a corporate income tax system, of sorts.  All 25 countries with the exception of
Croatia, FYR Macedonia and Slovenia had a VAT system in place by 1996.  All TEs in our study
have a social security tax system mostly financed by payroll taxes, with contributions being made
by employers and/or employees.  For all countries in our study, tax coverage is for general
government, comprising of central and state, regional or provincial units of government and local
government.
An exercise in calculating statutory versus effective taxation depends on data pertaining to tax
rates, tax takes and tax bases.  As for statutory taxation, the basic tax rates are taken primarily
from international tax handbooks.  In particular, we used the IBFD’s European Tax Handbook,
Coopers & Lybrand’s International Tax Summaries and Ernst & Young’s Worldwide Tax Guides.
We also used various EBRD Transition Reports.  Tax payments were obtained from the
governments’ fiscal accounts where taxes are reported on a cash basis, i.e., counting actual
receipts rather than accrued liabilities.  Where possible, tax payments data are from the IMF’s
Government Finance Statistics Yearbook ( GFSY) or the CIS Statistical Yearbook.  Other
publications used include the OECD’s Revenue Statistics, the IMF’s Staff Country Reports and
statistical yearbooks for various countries.
As already mentioned, the tax bases for the three types of taxes are taken from the national
accounts.  For VAT, we use GDP as a proxy for the VAT base.  Although in all VAT systems
there are some goods and services that are exempt from VAT, the most important of these
exemptions are quite standard (e.g., public administration, education) and hence GDP is a
reasonable proxy.  For CIT, we use gross operating surplus as a proxy for the tax base on
corporate capital income.
   Operating surplus corresponds to value added after deducting the
compensation of employees and net taxes on production; it is the balancing item in the national
                                                          
6 The USSR was disbanded in December 1991 and was replaced by fifteen independent republics.8
accounts.  Due to the difficulties in acquiring reliable estimates for the operating surplus of
corporations for 25 countries, we instead use the operating surplus of the economy.
7  For SST, we
use compensation of employees as a proxy for the tax base.  Compensation of employees is the
sum of gross wages and salaries plus employers’ social contributions.
Although imperfect, these are reasonably good approximations given the omissions in the
national accounts, the dubious nature of some transition countries’ data and the cross-country
nature of the exercise.  The main publications used for national accounts data are the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics Yearbook, the OECD’s National Accounts Main Aggregates,
the CIS Statistical Yearbook and statistical yearbooks for various countries.
The data sources used for all 25 countries are listed in Table 5, in the Appendix.
The statutory tax rates and the actual tax/GDP ratios for each of the 3 taxes, for our 25 countries
are reported in Table 2.
                                                          
7Likewise, we use gross rather than net operating surplus because the treatment of depreciation varies from
one jurisdiction to another.  Aside from depreciation provisions, corporate tax systems differ from country
to country, in respect of treatment of interest payments, stock appreciation provisions and integration with
the personal income tax system.  Accordingly, computations arising from cross-country comparisons of
corporate tax systems should be treated with caution.  This is particularly true when the cross-country
comparisons include the likes of Russia whose accounting rules are different to international standards.9
Table 2: Statutory Tax Rates and Tax/GDP Ratios for 25 TEs, 1997
Country VAT SST CIT
Statutory
tax rate
VAT/GDP Statutory
tax rate
SST/GDP Statutory
tax rate
CIT/GDP
CEE Countries
Albania 12.5 4.6 42.5 3.9 30 0.7
Bulgaria 22 6.2 44 6.9 36 6.4
Croatia -- -- 43.4 14.4 35 2.0
Czech Republic 22 7.1 47.5 15.2 39 3.4
FYR Macedonia -- -- 30.1 12.3 15 0.7
Hungary 25 7.9 57 13.1 18 1.9
Poland 22 8.3 48.2 11.0 38 3.1
Romania 18 4.7 34 7.1 38 4.3
Slovak Republic 23 8.4 50 14.4 40 3.7
Slovenia -- -- 38 13.8 25 1.2
FSU Countries
Armenia
1 20 3.3 38 2.9 30 2.5
Azerbaijan 20 3.8 39 2.5 32 2.8
Belarus 20 9.4 37 10.1 30 4.7
Estonia 18 10.4 33 10.7 26 1.9
Georgia 20 3.2 34 2.2 20 0.6
Kazakhstan 20 3.5 32 6.2 30 2.4
Kyrgyzstan 20 5.6 37 5.9 30 1.1
Latvia 18 8.8 37 10.5 25 2.4
Lithuania 18 8.7 31 7.0 29 1.6
Moldova 20 9.4 40 7.2 32 2.4
Russia 20 7.2 39.5 9.9 35 4.2
Tajikistan 20 1.5 38 1.6 40 1.2
Turkmenistan 20 7.2 31 4.5 25 5.2
Ukraine 20 8.1 40 11.1 30 6.1
Uzbekistan
1 17 6.1 43 6.7 37 7.9
Sources: IBFD, 1998; IMF 1999.
Notes: (1) The figures for Armenia and Uzbekistan are for 1996.
-- = not applicable.
As we can see from Table 2, many of the 25 transition countries in our study have the same
statutory tax rates.  This is particularly true for value-added tax where 11 of the FSU countries
have a VAT rate of 20 per cent.  Yet, the actual tax/GDP ratios across countries differ quite
substantially.  Assuming tax bases are not too dissimilar across countries, one interpretation of
differences in tax ratios is the quality of tax administration across countries.  The methodology
outlined in section three allows us to investigate this further.10
5.  Results and Analysis
Table 3 is a cross-country comparison showing the two indicators for the three different taxes for
the 25 transition countries.  We report estimates for the TEs for 1997 as the 1998 data for some
FSU countries is distorted by the August 1998 Russian crisis.  The benchmark is the 1996
average of the EU-15 countries.  Our estimates are highly approximate and precise values should
be treated accordingly.  Nevertheless, they do provide a measure of effective tax administration
and, in the case of some TEs, point to poor tax collection and weak tax administration.
 8
                                                          
8 Treisman (1999) uses a ‘tax accounting’ method to measure the effectiveness of tax collection, in Russia.
In his paper, the unexplained parts of the fall in tax revenues are attributed to the poor quality of tax
administration, i.e. ineffective tax collection.11
Table 3: Statutory and Effective Taxation, 1997
E/S = effective/statutory ratio;  NTY = normalised tax yield
Country VAT SST CIT
E/S NTY E/S NTY E/S NTY
EBRD
Transition
Indicator
CEE Countries
Albania 0.42 7.0 n.a. 3.7 n.a. 0.8 2.58
Bulgaria 0.34 5.7 0.61 6.5 0.31 6.3 2.75
Croatia -- -- n.a. 13.6 n.a. 2.0 3.00
Czech Republic 0.40 6.6 0.94 13.5 0.23 3.0 3.46
FYR Macedonia -- -- n.a. 15.2 n.a. 1.6 2.63
Hungary 0.40 6.6 0.80 10.3 0.26 3.7 3.67
Poland 0.46 7.7 0.76 9.7 0.20 2.9 3.42
Romania 0.31 5.1 0.83 8.0 0.21 4.0 2.67
Slovak Republic 0.45 7.5 0.93 12.3 0.22 3.3 3.25
Slovenia -- -- 0.94 14.3 0.15 1.6 3.21
FSU Countries
Armenia
1 0.20 3.3 0.27 3.0 0.16 3.0 2.38
Azerbaijan 0.23 3.8 0.46 2.6 0.12 3.1 2.04
Belarus 0.57 9.4 0.87 10.7 0.39 5.4 1.63
Estonia 0.68 11.4 0.83 12.3 0.22 2.6 3.42
Georgia 0.19 3.2 0.38 2.5 0.04 1.1 2.71
Kazakhstan 0.21 3.5 0.68 7.3 0.15 2.8 2.71
Kyrgyzstan 0.34 5.6 0.68 6.2 0.06 1.3 2.83
Latvia 0.58 9.6 0.76 11.1 0.23 3.4 3.08
Lithuania 0.57 9.6 0.71 8.4 0.13 2.0 3.04
Moldova 0.56 9.4 0.60 7.2 0.18 2.6 2.63
Russia 0.43 7.3 0.71 10.0 0.33 4.2 3.00
Tajikistan 0.09 1.5 0.31 1.6 0.04 1.0 1.58
Turkmenistan 0.43 7.2 n.a. 5.5 n.a. 7.3 1.46
Ukraine 0.49 8.2 0.80 11.1 0.63 7.1 2.46
Uzbekistan
1 0.42 7.0 0.61 6.4 0.47 7.5 2.38
EU-15 Mean 0.45 7.4 0.88 12.5 0.24 3.0
Notes: (1) The estimates for Armenia and Uzbekistan are for 1996.
-- = not applicable.  n.a. = not available.
EBRD Transition Indicator: average indicator for 1997
As we can see from the table, the (unweighted) means of the E/S ratios in the EU-15 for VAT,
SST and CIT are 0.45, 0.88 and 0.24 respectively.  When we normalise the EU-15 VAT, SST and
CIT yields at our benchmark rates of 20% (b=16.7%), 40% (b=28.6%) and 35% respectively, we
get normalised tax yields of 7.4, 12.5 and 3.0 percent of GDP respectively. How do the rates for
TEs compare with these levels for the EU?12
The results indicate that the 25 transition countries on average are not as effective in tax
collection or enforcement compared to the average for EU countries.  The (unweighted) means of
the E/S ratio for the TEs for VAT, SST and CIT are 0.40, 0.69 and 0.23 respectively.  Moreover,
the variations from the mean are large for the TEs, compared to the EU countries.  For the EU-15
countries, the standard deviations of the E/S ratio for the three tax categories are 0.06, 0.18 and
0.12 respectively.  This compares to 0.15, 0.20 and 0.14 respectively for the TEs.
For many transition countries, revenue erosion has become a serious obstacle in their attempts to
embrace effective fiscal policy.
9 Pre-transition, many ex-socialist economies had high
government revenue shares of GDP.  With most of economic activity taking place in the state
sector, tax collection was a straightforward task.  In contrast, for a market economy, the private
sector dominates and confrontation between taxpayers and tax collectors is not uncommon.  Thus,
in the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy, a fall in revenue was not
unexpected.  Yet, for some transition economies, the fall in revenue has been excessive, with
tax/GDP ratios currently at levels below what is considered normal in many market economies.
Of course, for many TEs with income per capita levels below $1,000 per annum, tax capacity is
low (see Tait, Gratz, and Eichengreen, 1979).  Our research indicates that, in addition to having a
low tax capacity, TEs have relatively low tax effectiveness rates.
We now turn our attention to factors related to effective tax administration in transition countries.
We begin by investigating the relationship between the effectiveness of tax collection and
progress in transition.  A  priori, we might expect to find a positive relationship between progress
in transition and effective tax administration.
We take as our measure of progress in transition the average of the EBRD transition indicators for
1997;
10 these are reported in Table 3 for all 25 TEs in our study.  We present the relationship
between progress in transition and the effectiveness of tax administration by means of a
scatterplot in which the average EBRD transition indicator is plotted on the X-axis and the E/S
                                                          
9 The primary objective of taxation is to raise revenues, as efficiently and equitably as possible, in order to
finance government spending.  It was the great French financier Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-83) who once
said, “The art of taxation consists in so plucking the goose as to obtain the largest possible amount of
feathers with the smallest possible amount of hissing.”  In many of the FSU countries, the government’s
revenue problem is further exasperated by the realisation that a portion of revenue is in non-cash form.
10 The EBRD transition indicators are a set of numerical indicators across a range of dimensions, under the
headings – markets and trade, enterprises, and financial institutions.  The purpose is to measure the
progress of economic reforms.  A more detailed explanation can be found in any of the EBRD Transition
Reports.13
ratio is plotted on the Y-axis.  This exercise is carried out separately for the three categories of
taxes covered in our study.
11  The horizontal line in each of the scatterplots is the relevant EU
mean, plotted to provide a benchmark for comparison.  All three scatterplots are depicted in
Figure 1.  Our second indicator, the normalised tax yield (NTY) is plotted against the average
EBRD transition indicator in Figure 2.  As the E/S ratio and the NTY measure are highly
correlated, the scatterplots in Figures 1 and 2 are similar.
The relationship between progress in transition and effectiveness of tax administration comes out
quite clearly in two of the three taxes we are examining, namely VAT and SST.  The largest
difference is between the so-called leading reformers (Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Czech and
Slovak Republics, the Baltic States) and the laggard reformers (the Balkans and most of the CIS
countries), but there are other differences of interest between the TEs.  One interesting
comparison is between the Ukraine and Russia.  Although Russia has made more progress in
transition (as judged by the EBRD transition indicators) than the Ukraine, it fares worse in terms
of tax collection (as measured by our E/S ratio).  Russia’s poor relative performance as regards
tax collection may have something to do with the nature of its federal tax system.
12  In particular,
perverse incentives arising from divided property rights between different levels of government
exasperate the tax collection problems in Russia.  It is not uncommon for enterprises and regional
governments to collude against the federal government and the tax collection agency, the STS
(State Tax Service).  Likewise, any improvements in tax collection at subnational levels are likely
to be penalised or “taxed away” by reductions in transfers (see Shleifer and Treisman, 2000).
13
We examine the three categories of taxes separately.  In the discussion that follows, we only refer
to one set of scatterplots, namely Figure 1.
•   Value-Added Tax
There is a strong positive correlation between progress in transition and the effectiveness of VAT
collection.  All the leading reformers that have a VAT system have E/S ratios that are close to the
EU benchmark of 0.45.  These advanced reformers are all clustered in the top right-hand corner
                                                          
11 As we can see from Table 3, the results for CIT are different to those for either VAT or SST.  This
observation applies to the two groups of countries in our study, namely EU countries and transition
countries.  Accordingly, in any analysis of our calculations, we treat the three categories of taxes
separately.
12 Recently described as a ‘country that has moderate statutory tax rates but a corrupt system of tax
administration.’ (see Friedman et al., 1999).
13 According to various sources, tax collection (and, in particular, federal tax) improved in Russia in 1999.14
of Figure 1a.   In contrast, the majority of the laggard reformers are clustered in the bottom left-
hand quadrant: the slow reformers have E/S ratios below the EU benchmark.  The interesting
feature is captured in the top left-hand quadrant where a small number of slow reformers
(Moldova, Belarus, Turkmenistan and Ukraine) have high E/S ratios.  Slow reformers with
relatively high E/S ratios and normalised VAT yields may be accounted for by the observation
that these TEs have maintained a functioning state, a feature that may have prevented the revenue
erosion that is prevalent in most of the slow reforming TEs.
 14
•   Social Security Tax
As in the case of VAT, there appears to be a positive correlation between progress in transition
and the effectiveness of SST collection.  All the leading reformers occupy the top right-hand
quadrant of Figure 1b.  This group of TEs has E/S ratios similar to the EU benchmark of 0.88.
This is in sharp contrast to the bulk of the slow reformers that have E/S ratios and normalised tax
yields below the EU benchmark.  Among this group, the lowest E/S ratios are concentrated in
TEs that have suffered internal conflicts (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan) or that have
witnessed a collapse of the state (Georgia, for example).  Again, we see that there are a small
number of so-called slow reformers that have managed to maintain tax discipline, in this case
with respect to payroll taxes.  Belarus and the Ukraine both have E/S ratios close to the EU
benchmark.  As with VAT collection, strong presidential leadership (Lukashenka and Kuchma,
respectively) combined with functioning state institutions, albeit in need of reform, may explain
these high E/S ratios and normalised tax yields.
•   Corporate Income Tax
The mean of the E/S ratio in the EU-15 for corporate income tax is 0.24.  The normalised tax
yield is three per cent of GDP.  Again, we see from Figure 1c that the leading TEs are all tightly
clustered around the EU benchmark.  This contrasts sharply with the laggard reformers, some
with E/S ratios above the EU level.  One possible explanation for why some of the slow reformers
                                                          
14 The ability of some slow reforming TEs to collect tax (Ukraine and Belarus, in particular) has been
alluded to in the transition literature, in Murrell (1996), EBRD (1994, 1999) and elsewhere.  Johnson,
Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997) argue that it is the repressive nature of states (Belarus, possibly Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan) and their willingness to suppress the unofficial economy that explains high collection
rates.  The case of Moldova is less clear.  For example, it is true that VAT collection in Moldova has
improved, due to the recent elimination of many exemptions.  Nonetheless, its total tax/GDP ratio, at close
to 30% in 1997, seems very high for a country with a GDP per capita of less than $600.  One possible
explanation is that the GDP figure may be an underestimate, failing to adequately account for the unofficial
economy.15
have high normalised CIT yields is the upward inflation bias in profits arising from historical cost
accounting.  High inflation rates prevalent in TEs would generate large profits and high tax
yields.  This may explain why the leading TEs, in general, experience a fall in the E/S ratio for
CIT during the transition period.  The average E/S ratio in 1991, at the beginning of transition, for
Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia was 0.42.  By 1997 the average E/S ratio for these (now
four) advanced reformers had fallen to 0.23.
To summarise, leading reformers (advanced CEE countries and the Baltic States) and countries
that have maintained a functioning state (Belarus, Ukraine and Uzbekistan) have higher levels of
tax compliance and collection than either slow reformers (Romania, Bulgaria),
15 countries with
decaying or corrupt states (Russia, Georgia) or countries that have suffered internal conflicts
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan).  A somewhat similar result emerged from the EBRD/WB
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) section on progress in
economic reform, quality of governance and state intervention (see text below).  Whereas
countries that have adopted partial reforms score badly in terms of the quality of governance, it is
the most advanced and the least advanced countries that score well in terms of governance.
Likewise, the survey results indicate that “…progress in transition is not necessarily synonymous
with a reduction in state intervention in enterprises” (EBRD, 1999, p.122).  Again, high levels of
state intervention are evident in many of the leading transition countries and in the least advanced
transition countries.  These results raise serious issues, including the need to rethink, in the
context of the transition experience and often in a political and institutional vacuum, the state’s
capacity to govern and the need for market institutions to develop.
The EBRD’s transition indicators summarise overall “progress in transition”.  We now briefly
explore one possible specific contributor to the ineffectiveness of tax administration, namely
corruption and bribery.  It is not uncommon for enterprises in TEs (and in market economies,
although presumably less so) to pay bribes to government officials in return for various services
or favours.  As these payments are direct private benefits to public officials, they do not turn up in
the government fiscal accounts.  Yet, in all other respects, they can be viewed as unofficial taxes
that add to the tax burden of enterprises.  Is it possible that TEs that report low ‘official’ tax
revenue shares as a percentage of GDP have high ‘unofficial’ taxes, in the form of bribes?
                                                                                                                                                                            
15 After the 1996/97 financial crisis in Bulgaria, the authorities introduced various reform measures,
including changes to the tax administration system.  These and other tax reform measures contributed to an
improvement in tax collection in 1998, reflected in higher E/S ratios for both VAT and SST.16
In Table 4 we reproduce a measure of the extent to which firms pay bribes to government
officials.  The measure was constructed from the BEEPS, conducted by the EBRD and the World
Bank in over 3,000 firms in 20 countries and reported in EBRD (1999).  To estimate a measure of
bribes, firms were asked what percentage of annual revenues were made by ‘firms like yours’ in
‘unofficial payments’ to public officials.  In the countries surveyed, the average bribe tax ranges
from a low of 2.1 per cent of annual revenues in Croatia to a high of 8.1 per cent in Georgia.  For
comparison, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the most
recognised measure of corruption, is also reported.
16
Table 4: Bribe tax and Corruption for TEs
Country Ave. Bribe
Tax
CPI Country Ave. Bribe
Tax
CPI
CEE Countries FSU Countries
Albania na 7.7 Armenia 6.8 7.5
Bulgaria 3.5 6.7 Azerbaijan 6.6 8.3
Croatia 2.1 7.3 Belarus 3.1 6.6
Czech Republic 4.5 5.4 Estonia 2.8 4.3
FYR Macedonia na 6.7 Georgia 8.1 7.7
Hungary 3.5 4.8 Kazakhstan 4.7 7.7
Poland 2.5 5.8 Kyrgyzstan 5.5 7.8
Romania 4.0 6.7 Latvia na 6.6
Slovak Republic 3.7 6.3 Lithuania 4.2 6.2
Slovenia 3.4 4.0 Moldova 6.1 7.4
Russia 4.1 7.6
Tajikistan na na
Turkmenistan na na
Ukraine 6.5 7.4
Uzbekistan 5.7 8.2
Sources: EBRD Transition Report 1999; Transparency International’s website http://www.transparency.de/
Figures 3a and 3b plot our E/S ratio measure for VAT and SST against the average bribe tax as a
percentage of annual firm revenues, for 18 and 19 transition countries respectively.
17  Countries
that have a high measure of effective tax administration (Estonia, Poland and Belarus, for
example) also have a relatively low average tax bribe.  In contrast, countries with ineffective tax
                                                          
16 The organisation Transparency International ranks countries, on the basis of surveys, in terms of the
degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians.  The CPI score
ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (virtually corrupt free).  To allow for comparisons with the BEEPS
bribery tax, we have adjusted the CPI scores, e.g. Bulgaria’s CPI score of 3.3 is adjusted to 6.7.  The CPI
scores recorded in Table 4 are for 1999; scores for previous years are unavailable for many of the TEs.
17 From the 20 countries in the EBRD/WB survey, we exclude Croatia and Slovenia from Figure 3a as
neither country had a VAT system in place in 1997.  Figure 3b does not include Croatia as there is no E/S
ratio available.17
administration (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, for example) have a relatively high average tax
bribe.  The correlation coefficients are –0.54 and –0.74 respectively.  As we did before, we plot
the normalised tax yield (NTY) in Figure 4.  Again, as we expect, the scatterplots in Figures 3
and 4 are similar.
If we use Transparency International’s CPI as the measure of corruption, we get similar results.
Although interesting, more evidence needs to be gathered before any strong conclusions can be
drawn.
6. Conclusions and Further Research
In this paper we adopted an existing methodology to measure the effectiveness of tax
administration. Comparing effective with statutory taxation allows us to get a handle on the
administrative capacity of tax systems.  The results indicate that, on average, the 25 TEs are not
as effective in tax collection as compared to the average of the EU countries.  A more surprising
result is the differences between TEs: in particular, the ability of some slow reformers to maintain
high tax collection rates.
As for policy implications, tax administration reforms have lagged behind general tax reforms
since transition began, often because administrative reforms (and consequently the benefits) take
time.  Market-oriented fiscal institutions (tax administration, treasury) do not develop overnight.
Administrative reforms involve changes in incentives and in the behaviour of taxpayers and
public officials.  In general, TEs with tax collection problems need to widen the tax base by
subjecting previously exempt income to taxation, reduce exemptions and allowances and, where
possible, implement lower (to discourage tax avoidance and evasion) and single (to avoid the
rent-seeking activities of producers) tax rates.  Ending the tradition of bargaining and negotiating
between the authorities and the taxpayer might prove more difficult given the political constraints
in TEs.  For federal systems (Russia, for example), intergovernmental fiscal relations need to be
rule-based and transparent.  Specific tax administration measures for TEs might include
strengthening the tax administration (assessment, collection, enforcement) agencies in terms of
organisation and personnel (as well as the legal and accounting professions), codification of the
various tax laws, greater efforts at improving the data on taxpayers, simplifying the registering,
reporting and filing requirements, greater penalties (monetary and otherwise) for non-compliance18
and/or positive encouragement for compliance and educating taxpayers about their obligations.
In the implementation of these reforms, it is important that the constraints (and the traditional
values and practices) of TEs are recognised.
18
As for future work, we would like to extend our data coverage to a larger set of countries.  In
particular, we would like to include non-EU OECD countries and, where possible, developing
countries.  Inclusion of non-EU OECD countries would provide us with an alternate and possibly
more suitable benchmark to the EU-15.  The more interesting possibility would be to apply our
methodology to tax data for a range of developing countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa
and for the Newly Industrialised Countries of South East Asia.  This would allow us to compare
ex-socialist transition countries with countries that closely resemble TEs either in terms of initial
conditions or in terms of a ‘transition’ experience.  For example, a more suitable comparison for
the fast growing countries like Poland, Estonia and Hungary might be the Tiger countries of
South East Asia.  Likewise, the FSU countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus states more
resemble, in terms of GDP per capita and sectoral composition, developing countries than EU
countries.  One implication of this would be a need to extend the tax classifications to include
foreign trade taxes.  Although revenue from duties on international trade is tiny for EU countries,
it is a major source of revenue for developing countries and for some transition countries.  By
extending the coverage to developing countries, it would also allow us to make more meaningful
policy prescriptions as regards tax reform for transition countries.  This is the next step in our
research.  Alternately and in the context of EU enlargement, tax harmonisation and fiscal
convergence, our effective tax rates can be used to examine the overall tax burden and the
distribution of the tax burden across different tax bases in EU countries and in the transition
accession countries.  We will pursue this work at a later stage.
In this paper, we briefly examined some factors that might impinge on tax administration and
collection in transition countries.  In particular, we explored the significance of two factors,
namely progress in transition and corruption.  We would like to extend this line of research.
Other possible explanatory factors may include the shadow economy and tax evasion, the initial
conditions, political constraints and the distribution of power, GDP per capita and levels of
                                                          
18 Many of the TEs are poor with very low incomes per capita.  In 1997, the Caucasus states of Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia had an (unweighted) average GDP per capita of US$640 approximately.  The five
Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) had an average
GDP per capita of approximately US$615 (EBRD, Transition Report 1999).19
development.  Some of these factors are not unique to TEs, applying to developing and developed
countries alike.
With respect to fiscal and tax reform, the first decade of transition has focused primarily on tax
design.  If further revenue erosion is to be avoided, the next decade must concentrate on
administrative reform.  In the Transition Report 1994, the EBRD called for a strengthening of tax
administration, an issue that “lies at the core of fiscal reform.”
19  For many TEs, this policy
recommendation is as relevant today as it was in the early years of transition.
                                                          
19 EBRD, 1994, p.88.20
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APPENDIX
Table 5:  Data Sources for the 25 TEs
Country Tax
Rates
Tax Payments GDP Capital and
Labour Income
Albania IBFD;
EBRD
IMF1 IMF2 NA
Bulgaria IBFD;
EBRD
IMF1 IMF2 NSO
Croatia IBFD;
ERBD
IMF1 IMF2 NA
Czech Republic IBFD;
EBRD
IMF1 IMF2 NSO
FYR
Macedonia
IBFD;
EBRD
IMF1 IMF2 NA
Hungary IBFD;
EBRD
IMF1 IMF2 NSO
Poland IBFD;
EBRD
IMF1 IMF2 NSO
Romania IBFD;
EBRD
IMF1 IMF2 NSO
Slovak
Republic
IBFD;
EBRD
IMF1 IMF2 NSO
Slovenia IBFD;
EBRD
IMF1 IMF2 NSO
Armenia IBFD;
EBRD
IMF1; CIS IMF2; CIS CIS
Azerbaijan IBFD;
EBRD
IMF1; CIS IMF2; CIS CIS
Belarus IBFD;
EBRD
IMF1; CIS IMF2; CIS CIS
Estonia IBFD;
EBRD
IMF1 IMF2 NSO
Georgia IBFD;
EBRD
IMF1: CIS IMF2; CIS CIS
Kazakhstan IBFD;
EBRD
IMF1; CIS IMF2; CIS CIS
Kyrgyzstan IBFD;
EBRD
IMF1; CIS IMF2; CIS CIS
Latvia IBFD;
EBRD
IMF1 IMF2 NSO
Lithuania IBFD;
EBRD
IMF1 IMF2 NSO
Moldova IBFD;
EBRD
IMF1; CIS IMF2; CIS CIS
Russia IBFD;
EBRD
IMF1; CIS IMF2; CIS CIS24
Tajikistan IBFD;
EBRD
IMF1; CIS IMF2; CIS CIS
Turkmenistan IBFD;
EBRD
IMF1; CIS IMF2; CIS NA
Ukraine IBFD;
EBRD
IMF1; CIS IMF2: CIS CIS
Uzbekistan IBFD;
EBRD
IMF1; CIS IMF2; CIS CIS
Notes: IBFD = International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation’s European Tax Handbook
EBRD = European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s Transition Reports
IMF1 = International Monetary Fund’s Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (GFSY)*
CIS = Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States Statistical Yearbook*
  IMF2 = International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics Yearbook*
NSO = various National Statistics Offices’ Statistical Bulletin
NA = Not Available
* An alternate source used is the International Monetary Fund’s Staff Country Reports / Recent
                 Economic Developments for the various countries25
Figure 1 Effective Tax Administration and Progress in Transition
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1c CIT Effective/Statutory Ratio 1997 vs. Progress in Transition
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Figure 2 Effective Tax Administration and Progress in Transition
2a VAT Normalised Tax Yield (NTY) 1997 vs. Progress in Transition
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2b SST Normal i sed Tax Yi el d ( NTY)  1997 vs.  Progress i n Transi t i on
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2c CIT Normalised Tax Yield (NTY) 1997 vs. Progress in Transition
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Figure 3 Effective Tax Administration and Bribery
3a VAT Effective/Statutory Ratio and the Average Bribe Tax
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Figure 4 Effective Tax Administration and Bribery
4b SST Normalised Tax Yield ( NTY) and Average Bribe Tax
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